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Aging, and Uncertainty 
David N. Weil 
The large wealth of the elderly, and the prospect for its transfer to a younger 
generation, is a subject that has attracted much attention from both economists 
and the popular press.’ This interest has been spurred by two factors: the in- 
creased wealth of the elderly, and changes in the ratio of  the number of  the 
elderly to their children that have been part of population aging. For example, 
the ratio of the average net worth of households with heads aged 66-75  to the 
average net worth of  households with heads aged 36-45  rose from 1.55 in 
1962 to 2.10 in 1983.2  Similarly, the lifetime fertility rate fell from 3.14 for 
women born 1886-90  (those who would be leaving bequests in the 1960s) to 
2.29 for those born 1906-10  (those leaving bequests in the 1980~).~ 
Economists differ in  their views on the importance of  intergenerational 
flows in general, and bequests in particular, for the levels of saving and capital 
accumulation. Kotlikoff and Summers (198  1) calculate that at least 80% of the 
wealth of those currently alive is the result of transfers (both bequests and inter 
vivos transfers) from previous generations. Arguing against the importance of 
bequests, Modigliani’s (1988) rough estimate is that they constitute an annual 
flow of approximately 1% of wealth. But even this low estimate of the impor- 
tance of  bequests leaves them a significant role: assuming a wealthlincome 
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1. “Baby-boomers will hit an $8 trillion inheritance  jackpot, a staggering transfer of  wealth that 
will change the nation” (New Way  to Get Rich 1990). 
2. Author’s calculations based on the 1962 and 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance. Net worth 
includes housing equity. 
3. Ryder (1986). Following 1906-10  cohort, lifetime fertility increases gradually to a peak of 
3.20 for the  1931-35  cohort, and then falls dramatically to an estimated 1.92 for the  1951-55 
cohort. 
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ratio of three, the size of the bequest flow is significant in comparison to the 
personal saving rate, which hovers around 5%. 
Such a large flow of wealth should have a large effect on the behavior of 
those who receive it. Evaluating how changes in the size of these flows-due, 
for example, to demographic change or to fiscal policy-will  affect other as- 
pects of the economy requires proper modeling of the role of these transfers 
in the decisions of their recipients. A number of papers have considered how 
the size of these flows is affected by changes in institutions or population age 
structure? In this paper, I examine the effects of the uncertainty that surrounds 
bequest receipt. 
Uncertainty has already been incorporated into the literature on intergenera- 
tional wealth flows in several ways. Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986) and 
Feldstein (1988) consider intergenerational  transfers in a world in which there 
is uncertainty about future wage income, either one’s own or one’s children’s. 
Similarly, Davies (198  1) and Hurd (1989), among others, consider the role of 
life-span uncertainty in generating bequests. Uncertainty about possible medi- 
cal expenses at the end of life has also been cited as a motivation for the elderly 
to hold onto substantial resources as they age, and thus as a source of acciden- 
tal bequests (Palumbo 1991). 
In this paper, I examine the importance of  uncertainty on the part of  the 
recipients of  the inheritances. Uncertainty about receipt of inheritances is in 
large part the flip side of  the uncertainty that generates bequests. The same 
end-of-life and medical-expense uncertainties that can generate bequests will 
be reflected in the expectations of those who may receive an inheritance. In- 
deed, one would expect that the uncertainty surrounding bequest receipt (in 
the case of accidental bequests) could only be larger than the uncertainty that 
generated the bequest:  in many cases, children may  not really know how 
wealthy their parents are or the exact nature of their parents’ wills. 
Recent literature on consumption has stressed the role of individual uncer- 
tainty as a factor affecting decision making (see Deaton 1992  for a discussion). 
Individual uncertainty about future wages, for example, is large in comparison 
to aggregate uncertainty about future wages. Similarly, individual uncertainty 
about future bequest receipts may be large in comparison to uncertainty about 
the aggregate flow of bequests. The uncertain nature of bequest flows, com- 
bined with their large size, means that modeling consumption out of expected 
bequests as if there were certainty about bequest receipt will tend to overstate 
the effects of such expected bequests. If  consumers are risk averse, then the 
expected utility of an uncertain bequest flow will be lower than in the case of 
certainty. Similarly, if consumers are “prudent” (Kimball 1990), then the path 
of consumption in the case of uncertainty will differ from what would be ob- 
served in a world with certainty. Skinner (1988) shows that uncertainty about 
future income flows effectively increases the discount rate that is applied to 
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their expected values. The fact that people “underconsume” (from the perspec- 
tive of  certainty equivalence) out of  expected bequests also means that con- 
sumption will, on average, rise rapidly as uncertainty about bequest receipt is 
resolved. Thus the expected lifetime path of consumption will slope upward 
more steeply than would be the case under certainty. 
In this paper, I examine the difference between the certainty and uncertainty 
models for a widely studied application: the effect of population aging on sav- 
ing. Population aging, by changing the relative sizes of the bequeathing gener- 
ation and those receiving bequests, has the potential to affect the average size 
of  bequests received, and  the saving of  bequest-receiving generation. In  a 
world with certainty equivalence, these anticipated changes in bequest flows 
would have immediate effects on the consumption decisions of those who ex- 
pect to receive them. If  uncertainty is important, by contrast, bequest flows 
will have their impact on consumption-and  a larger impact than under cer- 
tainty-only  at the time that they are received. Since the difference between 
when a person can form expectations about receiving bequests and when the 
uncertainty about their receipt is resolved can be a full generation, allowing 
for uncertainty can dramatically change the timing of the effects of changes in 
the bequest flow. 
Uncertainty also matters in evaluating the effects of changes in the annuiti- 
zation of the elderly, as discussed in Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Weil (1992). 
Providing annuities to the elderly reduces expected bequests-how  this affects 
consumption and saving of the young depends on how much the young were 
consuming out of these expected bequests. The immediate impact of annuitiza- 
tion on saving will be larger (that is, more negative) in a world where the 
uncertainty of bequests is taken into account than in a world of certainty equiv- 
alence. In both cases, the consumption of  the elderly who receive annuities 
will rise. In a world of certainty, saving of the young will rise to partially offset 
the loss of the bequests, while in a world with uncertainty, the young would 
not initially be consuming out of  expected bequests, and so would not alter 
their consumption much in response to a decline in expected  bequest^.^ 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 10.1, I examine an 
overlapping-generations  model in which bequests are generated by uncertainty 
about one’s own date of death, and in which this uncertainty is reflected in the 
consumption decisions  of  potential  inheritors. I  show  how  allowing  for 
bequest-receipt uncertainty affects the lifetime path of  consumption in both 
partial and general equilibrium. In section 10.2, I extend the model to allow for 
a second uncertainty: the possibility of large end-of-life medical expenditures. 
Section 10.3 uses the model to examine the effects of  population aging on 
5. Similarly, accounting for uncertainty in bequest receipt will change the analysis of the welfare 
implications of introducing  annuities, as in Hubbard and Judd (1987). Uncertainty makes expected 
bequests less valuable, and so reduces one welfare loss from annuities that would eliminate acci- 
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saving and the level of wealth. I show that accounting for uncertainty leads to 
a larger adjustment of the wealtidincome ratio in response to changes in popu- 
lation age structure than would otherwise be observed, and thus delays the 
effects of aging on the saving rate. Section 10.4 discusses the generality of the 
effects highlighted in this paper. 
10.1  Modeling Uncertainty in Bequest Receipt 
10.1.1  Previous Work 
Hubbard and Judd (1987) consider an overlapping-generations model in 
which bequests are generated by end-of-life uncertainty in the absence of an- 
nuities. In their model, however, the uncertainty that generates bequests is not 
passed on to the next generation: all the members of a cohort receive the same 
bequest, which is equal to the average bequest left each year by their parents’ 
cohort. The fact that individuals’ inheritance receipt is invariant to their own 
family’s mortality history means that all members of a birth cohort are ex ante 
identical. In the models of Abel (1985) and Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled 
(1983, by contrast, individuals receive as a bequest the actual wealth held by 
their parent, rather than the average wealth of the previous generation. But in 
these models, individuals receive bequests at birth (if they receive them at all), 
and so face no uncertainty about bequest receipt. Thus bequest receipt affects 
the level, but not the shape, of  the lifetime consumption profile. Kotlikoff, 
Shoven, and Spivak (1989) use a four-period model in which life-span uncer- 
tainty generates bequests to analyze the effects of different intergenerational 
bargaining outcomes on the distribution of wealth. Potential heirs face uncer- 
tainty about their inheritances at the beginning of  life. The model I present 
below has a similar structure, but extends the model to sixty periods, allowing 
for a much more realistic simulation of the lifetime paths of uncertainty, be- 
quest receipt, consumption, and wealth. 
The  analysis of  the  effects of  demographic change in  an overlapping- 
generations model with bequests that is presented in this paper is similar to 
that of Auerbach et al. (1989). In that paper, there is no life-span uncertainty, 
and bequests are generated directly by a “joy of giving” on the part of parents. 
Children receive their bequests upon their parents’ deaths, but know with cer- 
tainty the size of their inheritances from the beginning of life. Below I show 
that allowing for uncertainty in bequest receipt changes the timing of a demo- 
graphic change’s effect on saving. 
10.1.2  The Basic Model 
This section describes the basic model that will be used in the analysis. 
Individuals live for a maximum of 60 years. For the first 30 years of life there 
is no probability of dying. For the next 30 years, there is some known hazard, 
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to the set of hazards are a set of probabilities of being alive at each age i, P(i). 
Individuals who reach age 60 know with certainty that they will die in the 
next period. 
Families consist of a single parent and N children. Children are exactly 30 
years younger than their parents; thus there is no chance that an individual will 
die before his parent. There is no altruism or annuity market in the model, and 
so all bequests are accidental.6  There are two uncertainties  that face individuals 
in the model. First, individuals are uncertain about their own date of death. As 
is standard in many models, this uncertainty leads individuals  to leave acciden- 
tal bequests with some probability. Second, bequest recipients are uncertain as 
to when they will receive a bequest, if at all, and how large it will be. 
The model is structured so that these two uncertainties face the individual 
sequentially: by the end of his 30th year of life, an individual has completely 
resolved uncertainty about bequest receipt, but has not yet resolved any uncer- 
tainty about his own date of death. As in Abel’s (1985) model, the wealth that 
an individual inherits will be a function of not only his parent’s date of death, 
but also of  the dates of  death of  all of  his ancestors. However, a sufficient 
statistic summarizing all of a family’s history is the wealth of an individual at 
the end of his 30th year of life. This is all that a person’s child needs to know 
in order to form an expectation of bequest receipt. 
Throughout this paper I take the interest rate and the path of wages as exoge- 
nous, and focus on how changes in uncertainty affect the paths of consump- 
tion, saving, and bequests. 
The Individual S  Problem 
The individual takes as exogenous (and known from the beginning of life), 
a vector .rr(i), corresponding to the probability of receiving a bequest at age 
i, given that a bequest has not yet been received, and a second vector, b(i), 
corresponding to the size of the bequest that will be received at age i, given 
that one is received in that period. The individual is assumed to maximize the 
expected value of  a utility function that is time-separable and has constant 
relative risk aversion: 
where 6 is the pure rate of time discount, Pi is the probability of being alive in 
period i, c is consumption, and p is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
The individual’s wealth (measured at the beginning of each period) evolves 
according to 
6. There is also no risk sharing between generations. Such an  outcome will hold in the model 
of Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak (1989) if parents cannot credibly threaten not to leave any wealth 
left over at the end of their lives to their children. 326  David N. Weil 
where y, is labor income in period  i, r is the real interest rate, and D,  is a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if  a bequest is received in period  i. 
Individuals are born with no assets and are subject to the constraint that they 
cannot die in debt. 
Given that an individual has already resolved his uncertainty about receiving 
a bequest, it is easy to solve for the lifetime paths of wealth and consumption. 
The first-order condition for the individual’s optimization problem gives the 
growth rate of consumption as 
(3) 
and so consumption at age i is just a function of age, wealth, and the present 
discounted value of future wages: 
(4)  cz = 
E 
J’i 
w, + 2  yJ 
J=,(l+  r)J-’ 
Given certainty about bequest receipt, it is also easy to calculate an individual’s 
wealth path, and the path of his conditional bequest-that  is, the bequest that 
he will leave at age i if he dies at that age. 
Solving for the individual’s path of  consumption when facing uncertainty 
about the date and size of bequest receipt is more complicated. However, be- 
cause of  the nature of  the uncertainty, solution is not nearly as complex as 
many other problems involving consumption under uncertainty. Define crib( i) 
as the consumption at age i of an individual who has not received a bequest 
(because his parent is still alive), and cb(i)  as consumption of  an individual 
who has just received a bequest in period  i.  Similarly, define wnb((i)  as the 
wealth of an individual who has not received a bequest, and wb(  i)  as the wealth 
of an individual who has just received a bequest in period i.’ 
The wealth of an individual who receives a bequest in period i + 1 is simply 
(5)  w:+, = (wyb  + y, -  cyb)  X  (1 + r) + b,+l. 
This individual faces no future uncertainty except about his own life span: his 
consumption is the simple function of wealth and future wages derived above. 
Thus, given wealth and consumption in period  i, it is easy to calculate wealth 
and consumption in period i + 1 for an individual who does receive a bequest. 
7. Note that c: and wf  refer only to individuals who receive their bequests in period  i itself. 
Thus cf+,  is the consumption in period  i + I  of a person who received a bequest in period i + 1, 
and not the consumption in period  i + 1 of a person who received a bequest in period  i. 327  Intergenerational Transfers, Aging, and Uncertainty 
It is trickier to calculate the path of consumption in the case where a bequest 
has not yet been received, cob.  I take advantage of the first-order condition: 
Given values of c:” and c;+],  one can use this equation to calculate the value 
of c;:]. Thus, given an initial value of c;~,  one can use the first-order condition 
to calculate the full path of crib. And given the paths of crib and wnb  up through 
any age i, it is easy to calculate the paths of wealth and consumption from date 
i + 1 onward, given that a bequest is received. The final step in calculating the 
path cnh  is to find the correct value for cyb.  To do this, I take advantage of the 
fact that c$, that is, consumption at age 31 given that no bequest has been 
received, can be calculated two different ways. First, since there is no uncer- 
tainty about future bequests in this period, it can be calculated from the level 
of wealth that the individual carries into this period. Second, it can be calcu- 
lated from the first-order condition relating the marginal utility of consumption 
in adjacent periods. Only if these two values of consumption in the thirty-first 
period match was the initial guess at cyb correct. Finding the correct value of 
c;” is accomplished through a simple bracketing procedure.* 
Given an individual’s bequest expectations, one can calculate all of the pos- 
sible consumption paths that the individual may follow. Figure 10.1 illustrates 
some of the possible paths of individual wealth and consumption, depending 
on the date of bequest receipt. Wages are constant over the first 30 years of the 
individual’s life, and zero thereafter. The wage is set so that the present value 
of lifetime wages is equal to one hundred. The interest rate is set at 5%, and 
there is no time discounting. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is fout9 
The conditional mortality probabilities are those for women aged 65-95  in the 
United States in  1980, from Faber (1982). The paths of bequest probabilities 
and conditional bequest sizes are taken from the steady state of the model in 
the case where there is no uncertainty about bequest receipt, which is described 
more fully below. 
Figure 10.1 shows how consumption jumps in response to the realization of 
bequest receipt. Those who inherit early in life receive the most, since their 
parents have not run down their assets. Consumption growth for individuals 
who have already received bequests is constant until age 31, after which rising 
8. An alternative way of describing the final step in the solution procedure is as follows: Given 
an initial value of c”~,  one can use equations 4  and 6 to calculate the lifetime path of consumption 
for a person who never receives a bequest (noting that, after age 30, the value of P is simply zero). 
This path of consumption can then be checked against the lifetime budget constraint to see whether 
wealth at the end of the last possible period of life is zero. Only one initial value of c”~  will satisfy 
this condition. 
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Fig. 10.1  Realizations of consumption paths: basic model 
mortality hazard reduces it and eventually leads to falling consumption. The 
path of consumption during the first 30 years of life for those individuals who 
have not received a bequest is relatively flat and may even slope downward, 
despite the fact that the interest rate is greater than the discount rate and there 
is no possibility of death over this period. The reason for this phenomenon is 
that people who do not receive bequests receive a negative shock in each pe- 
riod to their expected bequests. Both positive and negative shocks are smaller 
as individuals approach age 30 and the amount of wealth that their parents have 
available to bequeath to them falls. At the same time, however, not receiving a 
bequest becomes more of a surprise as individuals age and their parent’s mor- 
tality hazard increases. 
Partial Equilibrium Effects of  Uncertainty 
I begin by examining the paths of consumption and wealth for individuals 
with given expected bequest paths. I compare the case of certain bequest re- 
ceipt with uncertainty, holding the size of the bequest flow constant. This par- 
tial equilibrium case is relevant if one wants to know how to evaluate a given 
level of expected bequest flow. In general equilibrium, of course, the size of 
the expected bequest flow received by a given generation will be dependent on 
the uncertainty faced by their parents. Thus, in the next section, I examine the 
general equilibrium patterns of  wealth and consumption in the certainty and 
uncertainty cases. 
I compare consumption paths with and without uncertainty about bequest 329  Intergenerational Transfers, Aging, and Uncertainty 
receipt, holding the expected path of  bequests constant. More concretely, I 
compare the average consumption of a cohort of  individuals each of  whom 
faces a vector of inheritance receipt probabilities a(i) and conditional inheri- 
tance sizes b(i),  with the consumption path of a cohort in which each individ- 
ual receives his ex ante expected inheritance at each age.I0  When bequest re- 
ceipt is uncertain, the average path of consumption is just the average across 
different realizations of bequest receipt of the paths shown in figure 10.1. 
The two consumption paths, labeled “no uncertainty” and “partial equilib- 
rium effect of uncertainty,” are shown in figure 10.2.l’  Note that in both these 
cases there is still uncertainty about the date of  one’s own death; the cases 
differ only in whether there is uncertainty about bequest receipt. The average 
level of consumption within the group that receives uncertain bequests rises 
more rapidly than consumption for the group with certain bequests, as individ- 
uals in the group get the news that they have received an inheritance. Put an- 
other way, uncertainty at the individual level depresses the initial level of con- 
sumption for members of  this  group. Members of  the group that receives 
uncertain bequests also hold more wealth in old age as a result of  their de- 
pressed initial consumption-and  thus will leave larger bequests. The next sec- 
tion discusses the general equilibrium effects of this difference in estates left 
as a function of expected inheritances received. 
General Equilibrium Effects of  Uncertainty 
By the time an individual completes his 30th year, his uncertainty regarding 
the age of  death of  his parent has been resolved. As in  standard models of 
accidental bequests, the individual chooses consumption over the rest of his 
life, facing only life-span uncertainty. In choosing this path for consumption 
and wealth, the individual also determines a path of contingent estates, B(i) = 
W(i).  From the point of view of that individual’s children, these contingent 
estates are a stream of contingent inheritance receipts. Given that children are 
exactly 30 years younger than their parents, and that each parent has N chil- 
dren, the conditional inheritance receipt at age i for an individual in familyj  is 
b,,j = Bi+30,j/N.  Similarly, the probability of bequest receipt in each period of 
the child’s life conditional on not having yet received a bequest is given by his 
parent’s mortality hazard: ai  =  pi+3o. 
10. There are two ways to model the case where there is no uncertainty: first, one can give to 
each member of a birth cohort in each year of his life his share of the total bequest left in that year 
by  his parent’s cohort. This is equivalent to giving each member of  the cohort in each year his 
expected bequest receipt for that year, and is the technique that I use here. Second, one can simply 
imagine that each individual knows the date of death (and thus the bequest) of  his own parent. In 
terms of the cohort-average paths of consumption, saving, and wealth, these two approaches give 
the same results, since the propensities  to consume out of a dollar of expected bequest (in the case 
of certainty) are invariant to the size of the bequest. Of course, the two approaches have different 
implications for the within-cohort distribution of wealth. 
11. The bequest paths, b(i)  and ~(i),  are those produced as steady states in the case of certain 
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Fig. 10.2  Average age-consumption  profiles: basic model 
At birth, individuals in a cohort differ only in the path of  conditional be- 
quests that they face. The wealth of an individual at the end of his 30th year of 
life, and thus the conditional bequest receipt path faced by  that individual’s 
children, is a function of the conditional bequest receipt path faced by  the 
individual and of the actual date of death of the individual’s parent. Thus any 
individual’s wealth is a function of the full history of his family. The individu- 
al’s wealth at the beginning of his 31st year, W3,,  serves as a sufficient statistic 
to summarize all of  a family’s history. Considering a large population, there 
will be a steady-state distribution of  W3,.’* 
The line in figure 10.2 labeled “general equilibrium effect of uncertainty” 
shows the average path of consumption in the steady state. Because uncertainty 
12. To solve for the steady-state  distributions  of consumption  and wealth, I discretized the range 
of possible values of  W,,. I then calculated a transition matrix between parent’s value of  W,, and 
child’s value of  W,!;  each element in the matrix corresponds to the probability that the child will 
have a given level of  wealth for the particular level of the parent’s wealth. A single row of  the 
matrix is constructed by considering a single level of parental wealth and calculating the child’s 
wealth for all possible dates of death of the parent. Taking this transition matrix to a high power 
yields a matrix in which each row is the steady-state distribution of W,].  Average life-cycle paths 
of consumption and wealth in the steady state are then calculated by  combining the distribution 
of W,,  with all possible dates of  death of the parent. This approach to finding the properties of the 
stochastic steady state turns out to be far more computationally efficient (and precise) than the 
approach of  actually drawing random dates of  death and then simulating over a large number of 
generations, as is done in Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak (1989). 331  Intergenerational Transfers, Aging, and Uncertainty 
about bequest receipt leads to a shifting of  consumption to later in life, be- 
quests are larger under uncertain bequest receipt than when bequests are cer- 
tain. Thus the general equilibrium effect of uncertainty about bequest receipt 
is larger than the effect in partial equilibrium. The increase in expected be- 
quests has only a minor effect on consumption early in life-once  again, as a 
result of prudence-and  so the average lifetime consumption profile is more 
steeply sloped than in the partial equilibrium case. Average wealth per capita 
(assuming a constant population) is 22% higher in general equilibrium when 
there is uncertainty about bequest receipt than when there is no such uncer- 
tainty. By contrast, the partial equilibrium effect of  allowing for uncertainty 
about bequest receipt is to raise wealth per capita by l2%.I3 
10.2  Adding Uncertainty about Medical Expenditures 
In the basic model presented above, the only uncertainty facing an elderly 
person (who has already resolved his bequest receipt uncertainty) is about the 
date of his death. Among the undesirable properties of this model is that on 
the last possible day of  life, wealth of the elderly goes down to zero.I4 The 
slow speed with which the elderly do run down their assets has raised the 
question of whether such a pattern would be observed in a world where there 
were a last possible day of life-that  is, whether the elderly have motivations 
other than their own future consumption for holding on to assets. 
In this section, I extend the model by having the elderly carry wealth until 
death. There are several interpretations that can be put on this wealth. First, it 
may represent money saved for end-of-life medical expenses. More generally, 
the household may have some chance of entering a state in which the marginal 
utility of  a given level of  consumption rises dramatically, and may  save for 
such an eventuality. Second, as has been well documented, the elderly hold a 
large fraction of their wealth in the form of houses, which are often held until 
death (Venti and Wise 1990; Sheiner and Weil 1992).15  Whether this housing 
wealth is held out of a desire to consume a specific bundle of housing itself, 
13. The values of the key parameters that produced this result were r = 5%, p = 4, and 6 = 0. 
Changing a single parameter (holding the other two at their base case values) had the following 
effects on the ratio of wealth per capita under uncertainty to wealth per capita under certainty 
(which is 1.22 in the base case): lowering p to 2 lowers the ratio to 1.15; lowering r to 0.03 lowers 
the ratio to 1.09; raising 6 to 0.03 lowers the ratio to 1.17. 
14. In the model, parents run down their wealth to zero at death, and thus children face uncer- 
tainty about the size of bequests received. But note that, even if parents keep the real value of 
wealth constant until death, there is uncertainty for the child about the present discounted value 
of bequest receipts. It is only when parents allow wealth to grow at the real interest rate that there 
is no uncertainty about the present discounted value of inheritances on the part of the children. 
15. Price variability in real estate is presumably less risky from the point of view of an elderly 
person than from the point of view of a potential heir. Homeowners are to a large extent insulated 
from risk from the price of their own home, since their housing cost falls in the state of the world 
where the asset value falls. But variation in the price of a parent’s home, which may constitute 
most of an expected bequest, is not similarly insured. 332  David N. Weil 
out of  a desire to provide for end-of-life medical expenses, or as an asset 
shielded from Medicaid’s tax is not clear. 
To be concrete, I focus on the possibility of end-of-life medical expenditures 
as an additional source of uncertainty facing the elderly. This modification af- 
fects the certainty of bequest receipt in two ways: first, because of health uncer- 
tainty, the elderly will carry higher assets, thus potentially leaving higher be- 
quests. Second, the lottery over end-of-life health adds more uncertainty to 
bequest receipt. It also moves this uncertainty later into the child’s life, and 
thus reduces the number of years over which shocks can be spread. 
Uncertainty about medical expenditures is introduced into the basic model 
as follows: I assume that individuals face a constant probability, q, of facing 
extra consumption needs in the last period of life. For simplicity, I hold this 
level of these needs constant at ten years’ worth of  wages. Thus individuals 
who have a possibility of dying will always have assets greater than this level. 
When individuals do die, their estate is equal to their total wealth with proba- 
bility (1 -  q),  and to their total wealth less this emergency fund with probabil- 
ity q. 
The basic model presented above can be straightforwardly extended to the 
case of end-of-life uncertainty modeled here. Once again, consumption for an 
individual who has resolved his uncertainty about receiving an inheritance, and 
who faces uncertainty only about his own date of death and his own end-of- 
life expenditures,  can be written as a function of wealth, age, and future wages. 
The first-order condition used to determine the path on consumption in the 
case where the parent has not yet died is 
(7) 
where c’  is consumption in period  i if  the individual’s parent died and had 
end-of-life medical expenses and c“  is consumption  in period  i if the individu- 
al’s parent died and did not have such expenses. 
Figure 10.3 shows some potential realizations of the path of consumption in 
the model with uncertainty about end-of-life expenditures.  There are now two 
uncertainties facing a potential heir: when his parent will die, and whether the 
parent will consume his emergency fund. The probability that a parent will 
face end-of-life expenditures (q) is set at 10%.  For heirs who are young when 
their parents die, there is a positive shock whether or not the parent has end- 
of-life expenses. For heirs who are old when their parents die, on the other 
hand, having a parent who faces large end-of-life expenditures constitutes a 
negative shock, and consumption falls. 
Figure 10.4 shows the partial and general equilibrium effects of uncertainty 
about bequest receipt in this model. Uncertainty about one’s own end-of-life 
































Fig. 10.4  Average age-consumption profiles: model with augmented 
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these larger bequests drive a bigger wedge between the behavior of consump- 
tion when bequest receipt is modeled as being certain and its behavior when 
bequest receipt is uncertain. The partial equilibrium effect is to raise consump- 
tion in the second half of life (after uncertainty about bequest receipt has been 
resolved) 15% above the level with certainty, as opposed to 9% in the basic 
model. In general equilibrium, consumption in the second half of life is 27% 
above its level with certainty, as opposed to 18% in the basic model. 
10.3  The Effects of Population Aging 
Over the next decades, the ratio of  old people to working-age population 
will be growing dramatically. Although this population aging is the product of 
decreases in both mortality and fertility rates, it is the latter that is by far the 
dominant force (Keyfitz 1985; Weil 1993). In changing the ratio of the elderly 
to their children, population aging affects either the size of bequests left, the 
size of bequests received, or both. In this section, I consider how the effects of 
population aging depend on the level of uncertainty surrounding bequest re- 
ceipt.  l6 
10.3.1  Steady States 
I begin by comparing steady-state levels of consumption and wealth (both 
aggregate and age profiles) for different levels of population growth and for 
different treatments of  bequest uncertainty. Figure  10.5 considers the four 
cases: with or without uncertainty about bequest receipt, and with or without 
uncertainty about end-of-life medical expenditures. For each case, the steady- 
state profile of consumption is plotted for the case where each individual has 
1.5 children and the case where each individual has 1 child (this is meant to 
correspond to a movement from 3 children per couple to 2 children per couple). 
The effect of having fewer children is to increase the size of bequests. Raising 
the level of bequests in turn raises the importance of uncertainty surrounding 
their arrival. 
Increasing end-of-life uncertainty or bequest receipt uncertainty increases 
the impact of changing the population growth rate. Steady-state consumption 
at age 3 1 is 13% higher due to a drop in population growth when neither uncer- 
tainty is present (fig. 10.5a); 25% higher when uncertainty about bequest re- 
ceipt alone is present (b); 18% higher when uncertainty about end-of-life ex- 
penses alone is present (c); and 37% higher when both uncertainties are present 
(d). In the cases where bequest receipt is uncertain, reducing the rate of popula- 
tion growth has only a small effect on initial levels of average consumption, 
and so induces a rapid growth rate of consumption over the course of life (as 
uncertainty is resolved). By contrast, when there is no uncertainty about be- 
16. The discussion here intentionally ignores the many other factors, such as changes in the 
youth and old-age dependency burdens, that will affect the saving rate as the population ages. 335  Intergenerational Transfers, Aging, and Uncertainty 
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Fig. 10.5  Effect of changing population growth on steady-state age- 
consumption profiles. EOL = end of life. 
quest receipt, reducing the rate of population growth leads only to a parallel 
shift upward in the lifetime consumption profile. 
These same effects can be seen in changes in assets. Reducing the rate of 
population  growth raises the steady-state level of  wealth  per capita by 25% 
when neither uncertainty is present (a); by 40% when only uncertainty about 
bequest receipt is present (b); by 28% when only uncertainty about end-of-life 
expenditures  is present  (c); and by  49% when  both uncertainties  are pres- 
ent (d). The fact that wealth per capita rises by more in the case of uncer- 
tainty than in the case of certainty means that, as will be shown below, there 
is a force offsetting the negative effect of a slowdown in population growth 
on saving. 
10.3.2  Dynamic Effects of Aging 
I now turn to the effects of population aging on the aggregate saving rate. 
My goal is to show how allowing for uncertainty in bequest receipt alters a 
model's predictions for the response of  saving to demographic change. I con- 
sider the following experiment: the economy is taken to be in a steady state in 
which each parent has 1.5 children and in which each birth cohort is  1.36% 
(= 1  .51/30  -  1) larger than the one that preceded it. Starting in year t, the num- 
ber of births is taken to remain constant. The decline in the birthrate is taken, 
in turn, to be a product of some of parents in the cohort of 31-year-olds having 336  David N. Weil 
birthrate of  1 (one child per parent), while the rest have a birthrate of 1.5. Over 
time, the fraction of  31-year-olds who have only one child rises until, after 
thirty years, all parents have a birthrate of  1. Thus, following the demographic 
transition, each birth cohort is made up of some fraction of people who have 
sibship of 1, and some who have sibship of  1.5.’’ After thirty years, all people 
born will have sibship of  1, but people within a birth cohort will differ in the 
number of generations in their family since the birthrate changed: for example, 
of the children born forty years after the demographic transition begins, 38% 
will be the second generation born with sibship of  1 (that is, their parents will 
also have had sibship of  1) and 62%  will be the first generation born with 
sibship of  1 (that is, their parents will have sibship of  1.5).’* 
Figure 10.6 shows the paths of  the saving rate, relative to its level in the 
initial steady state, for four cases considered above: with or without uncer- 
tainty about bequest receipt, and with or without uncertainty about end-of- 
life medical expenditures. With or without medical expenditures, allowing for 
uncertainty about bequest receipt delays the onset of lower saving in response 
to a decline in population growth. This is because, when bequest receipt is 
uncertain, individuals in the cohorts that will be receiving larger bequests do 
not immediately raise consumption in response to their larger expected be- 
quests, but rather wait until these bequests have been received. In the forty- 
fifth year of the demographic transition, the saving rate is equal to 30% of its 
initial level when there is no uncertainty about bequest receipt or end-of-life 
medical expenditures; 42% of its initial level when there is uncertainty about 
bequest receipt but not medical expenditures; 35% of  its initial level when 
there is uncertainty about medical expenditures but not bequest receipt; and 
50% of its initial level when both uncertainties are present. 
10.4  Extensions and Modifications 
Although the model presented above takes an important step in showing 
how uncertainty about bequest receipt can be incorporated into a life-cycle 
simulation, it is still very stylized. In this section, I discuss some of the ways 
in  which the real world differs from the model, and I examine how  these 
changes would affect the importance of  the effects that are present in  the 
model. 
A first point to be noted is the low level of  financial wealth held by most 
households. Other than a house, pension plans, and Social Security, most 
households in the United States have few assets. Given the large annuity pro- 
vided by  Social Security, this may be optimal behavior for households with 
life-cycle preferences. Alternatively, it may be evidence that something like a 
17. A person’s “sibship” is equal to one plus the number of his siblings. 
18. This somewhat complicated scheme is chosen to avoid the “cycling” of age-group sizes that 
would normally be observed if the birthrate for all families  jumped simultaneously,  and at the same 
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buffer stock model of saving (Deaton 1991; Carroll 1992) is applicable to most 
households. To the extent that the degree of saving in annuitized assets is not 
fully under the control of the household (which is certainly true for Social 
Security), households with low saving will be even less prone to consume out 
of expected bequests than the households facing uncertainty modeled above. 
Households will not be able to consume out of bequests until they are received, 
because they have no wealth to run down, and because uncollateralized bor- 
rowing is fairly limited. 
A second important consideration is the degree of uncertainty surrounding 
bequest. It seems clear that, among the very wealthy, although the timing of 
bequests is not known, the size (or more accurately, the present discounted 
value) of bequest receipts is not particularly uncertain. The very wealthy pass 
on assets at death for tax or personal reasons, not because the parents may need 
the money for their own consumption. Taken together these two points-the 
low level of life-cycle saving of most people, and unimportance of uncertainty 
for the wealthy-mean  that uncertainty about bequest receipt is probably more 
important for the median household, but less important for total saving and 
wealth accumulation, than is implied by the model presented here. 
In terms of  analyzing the effects of  demographic change, the model pre- 
sented here has addressed some important phenomena. The model holds con- 
stant both the average age difference between parents and children and the 
average age of heirs at the time that their parent dies. While the former of these 338  David N. Weil 
is not a terrible assumption for the United States, the latter is clearly false. In 
the United States, women’s life expectancy at the birth of the last child rose 
from 40.4 for women born 1900-1909 to 47.5 for women born 1940-49. This 
means that the average age of resolution of the uncertainty surrounding receipt 
of inheritances will have similarly risen, amplifying the effects analyzed here. 
Individuals who might fund their retirements with inheritances received from 
their parents may now have to wait until the time of their own retirements to 
see whether such inheritances are forthcoming. Prudent children faced with 
such a prospect will save for retirement on their own and, on average, see their 
postretirement consumption rise dramatically. 
Finally, a key question is how  different uncertainties interact. Hubbard, 
Skinner, and Zeldes (1994) focus on the interaction of three sources of uncer- 
tainty that face individuals: wages, health, and date of death. In this paper I 
have highlighted a fourth uncertainty: the date and size of bequest receipt. If 
one believes that bequests are an important factor in wealth accumulation, and 
that a significant fraction of  bequests are accidental, then uncertainty about 
bequest receipt should be added to the list of the “usual suspects.” 
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CO~ment  James M. Poterba 
This paper addresses a  substantively important but under-studied question 
about the relationship between intergenerational transfers and the consumption 
behavior of potential transfer recipients. Much previous research has focused 
on the possibility that retired households have bequest motives, and that this 
affects their rate of asset decumulation. Yet there has been little previous work 
on the link between expected bequests  and accumulation behavior of  the 
groups that may receive such transfers. 
This question is particularly important today, because the current older gen- 
eration is wealthier than its predecessors. One  estimate suggests that more than 
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$6 trillion in net worth is held by elderly households, those aged 60+ in 1989. 
The combined effects of rising real estate values and unexpected Social Secu- 
rity benefit increases in the 1970s, and a strong stock market in the  1980s, 
have left some current retirees quite wealthy. The expected transfers from this 
generation to their children are therefore substantial. One could ask whether 
these expected transfers explain the low saving rate of the U.S. economy in the 
1980s. This paper does not perform this applied exercise, but rather tackles a 
prior question by  developing a model for the consumption behavior of those 
who can expect to receive bequests. 
The centerpiece of this model is a set of  stochastic assumptions about the 
timing and amount of  bequests that recipients can expect. Conditional on a 
donor’s wealth at a given age, the only uncertainty about the bequest received 
stems from the donor’s uncertain mortality. In practice, this assumption is 
likely to substantially understate the actual uncertainty facing potential recip- 
ients. 
There are at least five additional sources of  bequest “noise.” First, many 
children are uncertain about their parents’ wealth holdings. Articles in the pop- 
ular press describing how recipients respond to the news of their inheritances 
stress that many have significantly misestimated the bequest they were eligible 
to receive. There are obvious reasons why this information is difficult to ob- 
tain: few families like discussing issues surrounding the parents’ death. Sec- 
ond, there is uncertainty about bequest division. While most children receive 
equal shares, there can be transfers to caregivers, churches, universities, or 
other groups that can substantially change the asset base available for children. 
Third, estate tax rules are subject to flux and, given their high marginal rates, 
can have an important effect on the after-tax bequest received by children of 
those with large estates. Fourth, there can be significant uncertainty about the 
parents’ consumption behavior, even excluding their needs for medical care. 
Will they move to Florida and buy a new home? How many vacations will they 
take? Finally, potential recipients may be uncertain about the asset returns that 
their parents will earn. Expected bequests can be sensitive to the expected 
trajectory of real house prices, a subject about which there is significant con- 
troversy. For recipients of larger bequests, they can also depend on the path of 
stock market returns. All of these factors reinforce the central finding of this 
paper, which is that uncertainty about bequest receipt makes the consumption 
effects of these transfers relatively small. 
There is another dimension along which the model could also be extended: 
to recognize endogenous earnings by  bequest recipients. There is some evi- 
dence that bequest recipients are more likely to start their own businesses, and 
more likely to retire, than are those who do not receive such transfers. The 
retirement option is particularly important for the current analysis, since the 
model assumes a fixed stream of labor income for the recipient generation. If 
recipients can vary their labor supply and consume more leisure in the event 
of  a significant inheritance, then they will not modify their prebequest con- 341  Intergenerational  Transfers, Aging, and Uncertainty 
sumption behavior as much as they will when labor supply is fixed. Once 
again, incorporating this behavioral reality is likely to strengthen the central 
findings in this paper. 
My final comment about this paper concerns the analysis in the closing sec- 
tions of how a demographic shock, a decline in fertility, will affect an econo- 
my’s aggregate saving rate. The paper presents a partial equilibrium calcula- 
tion, and it is important to recognize that there are important countervailing 
effects that make the net saving effect of a fertility decline ambiguous. These 
effects are particularly evident when society chooses to transfer resources to 
those at the beginning and end of the life cycle, and to finance those transfers 
with taxes on those of middle age. This transfer pattern, which characterizes 
most industrialized nations, creates a tension between two effects. In the short 
run, a decline in fertility reduces the transfer burden on working individuals 
because there are fewer young dependents to care for. This operates to raise 
current consumption and reduce the national saving rate. As the generation that 
had fewer children ages, however, the economy’s dependency burden rises, and 
in the new steady state with a lower fertility rate, there will be more elderly 
households for each working-age person. This long-run increase in the depen- 
dency burden is a factor that encourages current saving. How individuals and 
society respond to a fertility shock depends critically on the rate of time prefer- 
ence, and whether the near-term benefits of reduced dependency burdens are 
more or less important than the persistent long-term costs of  higher depen- 
dency. The present paper refines our understanding of  the consumption re- 
sponse to expected bequests, but (by design) it does relatively little to resolve 
the uncertainty concerning the effects of fertility changes on saving. This Page Intentionally Left Blank